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1. INTRODUCTION  
The Deepwater Horizon (DWH), an oil rig working for BP on the Macondo 
exploration well in the Gulf of Mexico, experienced a gas leak while closing out 
the well and subsequently exploded on the evening of April 20, 2010, killing eleven 
men and injuring many others. It subsequently burned and sank to the sea floor, and 
as a result of the blowout, between 3.26 and 5 million barrels of oil were released 
into the waters of the Gulf, becoming the largest accidental marine oil spill in 
history. 
What followed was a massive response on multiple fronts to contain the well 
(which finally succeeded on July 15, 2010). Efforts were made to capture, disperse, 
or burn the spilled oil; to protect coastal shorelines with boom and other devices; 
and to rescue and treat injured marine and other wildlife. Additionally, scientists 
and other personnel were sent out to establish pre-spill baselines, and policymakers 
responded with the issuance of new safety rules and a temporary moratorium on 
deepwater drilling (that lasted until October 12, 2010). 
What also followed was a fairly large research effort to figure out what went 
wrong and why. This included work to measure the effects of the spill as well as 
forward-looking research to better prepare for and mitigate the effects of future 
spills. Funds for these efforts came from many sources, but the largest of these was 
BP—who committed to providing $500 million over the course of ten years through 
the Gulf of Mexico Research Initiative (GOMRI)—and the National Science 
Foundation (NSF)—which funded over $19 million in rapid-response grants and 
just under $10 million in subsequent funding for research directly related to the 
DWH spill.  
This paper aims to outline what we have learned about the impacts of the DWH 
disaster from the economics discipline as well as what effect the DWH disaster has 
had on the discipline itself. It appears that what we currently know about the 
economic impact of the DWH oil spill is limited, possibly because such analysis is 
tied up in the federal Natural Resource Damage Assessment (NRDA) process 
and/or other state-led efforts. There is evidence, however, that the NRDA process 
has changed over time to de-emphasize economic valuation of damages (see 
Barbier 2011a), meaning that there may not be much NRDA-based economic 
research to speak of. Moreover, there is evidence that economists may be producing 
fewer outputs as a result of the DWH relative to scholars from other disciplines 
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because of an apparent absence of research inputs, i.e. public funding (that is, non-
litigation based, independent research funded by either private or public sources 
and carried out by either private or public sources purely for the sake of research), 
for economics research related to the DWH. Of the research that has taken place 
since the DWH disaster, this paper provides a summary and highlights the main 
directions of future research spurred by the DWH. It appears that the most pressing 
topic covered thus far in the economics (and related) literature focuses on 
addressing the incentives and policies in place to promote a culture of safety in the 
offshore oil industry, especially for deepwater drilling. Also, it appears that the 
most prominent, and challenging, direction of future research resulting from the 
DWH is the expansion of an ecosystems services approach to damage assessment 
and marine policy. First, the paper looks back at the Exxon Valdez disaster of 1989 
and how it impacted the economics discipline. 
2. LOOKING BACK: THE EXXON VALDEZ   
Prior to the DWH disaster in 2010, the Exxon Valdez accident in Prince William 
Sound, Alaska, served as the “high-water mark” for marine oil spills in the U.S. It, 
along with other oil accidents, led to the passage of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 
(OPA), which changed the rules of the game for the NRDA oil spills process (see 
Barbier 2011a for a detailed discussion of the OPA and the NRDA process). The 
OPA makes parties releasing oil into the environment liable not only for the cost of 
cleaning up those releases, but also for monetary compensation for damages, and 
authorizes public trustees to seek recovery of these damages (Barbier 2011a). It 
substantially increased spillers’ explicit liability for damages, making them liable 
for loss of natural resources, personal property, subsistence use, taxes, royalties, 
rents, fees, net profit shares by government entities, profits and earning capacity, 
and changes in costs of public services provision. The OPA also established the Oil 
Spill Liability Trust Fund, which may be used to pay for cleanup and damages not 
paid for by the spiller, and provides that costs of initiating the NRDA may come 
from the fund.  
Specific to the field of economics, the Valdez oil spill was a major catalyst (if 
not the catalyst) for the exponential growth in non-market valuation research, 
specifically stated-preference methods, and especially the contingent valuation 
method (CVM), which was at the center of a controversy about whether passive-
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use values were measurable and admissible in court as a legitimate type of damage 
(Carson et al. 2003). Specifically, Exxon sponsored a conference featuring research 
that concluded that the CVM was unreliable (Hausman 1993). In response, the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) commissioned a “Blue 
Ribbon” panel, co-chaired by Nobel Prize winners Kenneth Arrow and Robert 
Solow, to assess the validity of CVM. The panel concluded that, under the right 
conditions, the CVM could provide lost passive-use value estimates that could 
serve as a legitimate starting point for litigation (Arrow et al. 1993). Subsequently, 
two symposia were put on to address the issue, one by the American Agricultural 
Economics Association in 1993 (Carson, Meade, and Smith 1993; Desvousges et 
al. 1993; and Randall 1993), and another by the American Economic Association 
(AEA) in 1994 (Portney 1994: Hanemann 1994, and Diamond and Hausman 1994). 
From this point, stated-preferences research proliferated, building upon the work 
conducted prior to Valdez, such as Randall et al. (1974) and Mitchell and Carson 
(1989), and eventually led to the growth of the use of choice experiments for non-
market valuation. Since then, Carson (2011) has documented over 7,500 scholarly 
articles on CV, although Carson and Hanemann (2005) point out that most of the 
work that followed had more to do with increased demand for comprehensive 
benefit-cost assessments than with Valdez.  
 The DWH disaster reignited the sparks of Valdez, and the most visible and high-
level response in the economics field was a second contingent valuation symposium 
sponsored by the AEA in 2012 (Kling, Phaneuf, and Zhao 2012; Hausman 2012; 
Carson 2012). Kling, Phaneuf, and Zhao (2012) provide a balanced view of the 
CVM, focusing on four validity criteria (criterion, convergent, construct, and 
content). Carson (2012) summarizes the progress made on the CVM since Valdez, 
pointing out that many of the issues raised by critics can be directed not only to 
contingent valuation data but to market data, as well. He concludes that contingent 
valuation remains a practical valuation alternative. Hausman (2012) selectively 
reviews the literature since Valdez, fails to find progress since then, and declares 
the method “hopeless.” Although the previous two papers offer some 
counterarguments to the assertions made by Hausman (2012), they do not provide 
specific responses to his arguments. Haab et al. (2013) fill this gap by responding 
directly to Hausman’s points regarding hypothetical bias, the divergence between 
willingness to pay and willingness to accept, and the lack of scope effects.   
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Beyond the second symposium sponsored by the AEA and the response by 
Haab et al. (2013), however, the question is whether the DWH has and/or will 
invigorate and extend economic valuation research like the Valdez spill did. 
Although the papers in the 2012 AEA symposium use this prospect to motivate 
their discussions, evidence to the contrary does exist. Unlike the Valdez case, which 
was followed by a very public debate regarding the contingent valuation method 
that stimulated years of valuation research, no evidence suggests a similar impetus 
following the DWH. Barbier (2011a) points out that, prior to the passage of the 
OPA, economic valuation of damages was essential to the NRDA process—thus 
explaining the heavy emphasis on contingent valuation methods post-Valdez. 
Following passage of the act, however, the NRDA process was changed to de-
emphasize the role of, and need for, economic valuation of damages altogether. In 
this way, the legal wrangles over damage compensation as experienced post-Valdez 
could be largely avoided. Therefore, if Barbier is right, we may not see many 
economic research outputs come out of the NRDA process. Nonetheless, it is 
possible that this will shift demand for economic valuation research to those states 
pursuing legal compensation separate from, and in addition to, the NRDA process. 
We can get some sense of what to expect from efforts outside of the NRDA process 
by examining both the kinds and magnitude of research funding provided as a result 
of the DWH as well as what can be found in the relative economics literature. 
3. POST-DWH RESEARCH FUNDING 
A review of research projects funded by the National Science Foundation since 
April 2010 reveals that 168 DWH-focused projects were funded through NSF’s 
Rapid Response Research program, with aggregate funding of just over $19 
million. To identify such projects, the keyword search terms of “deepwater 
horizon”, “bp oil”, “gulf of Mexico oil” and “macondo blowout” were used (see 
Table 1 on next page).  
4




Of these, only 6 of the funded projects were categorized under the Directorate 
for Social, Behavioral, and Economic Sciences (SBE), with total funding of 
$261,386. This number of projects represents 3.6% of the total number of projects 
funded and 1.4% of total funding. Only the Directorate for Education and Human 
Resources had fewer projects funded and lower funding. Of the 6 SBE projects 
funded, two were under the Division of Behavioral and Cognitive Sciences, and 
sub-categorized under the cultural anthropology program. The remaining 4 came 
under the Division of Social and Economic Sciences; of these, 2 were sub-
categorized under the political science program, and the other two under the 
decision, risk, and management science program. These latter two would seem to 
be the two most likely to address economic aspects of the oil spill. It turns out, 
however, that both are actually focused on nuclear energy: one focuses on how the 
DWH disaster affects Americans’ perceptions of and preferences for nuclear 
energy, and the other focuses specifically on the Fukushima nuclear disaster. Thus, 
it appears that none of NSF’s Rapid Response Research funding went to any 
research focused on economic impacts or other economic issues related to the DWH 
disaster. Although NSF is obviously distinct from the NRDA process, it is possible 
that, perhaps, NSF’s funding decisions were influenced by the shift in emphasis in 
the NRDA process away from economic valuation of damages, rendering such 
work a low priority, even for NSF. 
In addition to Rapid Response Research funding, another 58 NSF projects were 
identified as related to the DWH, with aggregate funding of just under $10 million 






Table 1. National Science Foundation Grants focused on DWH Oil Spill, by NSF Directorate 




Projects %  Funding % 
# 
Projects % Funding % 
BIO 36 21.4 $4,811,191  25.1 6 10.3 $698,013  7.0 
CSE 11 6.5 $1,371,014  7.2 3 5.2 $898,492  9.0 
EHR 1 0.6 $200,000  1.0 4 6.9 $798,438  8.0 
         
ENG 31 18.5 $3,589,959  18.8 7 12.1 $916,654  9.2 
GEO 74 44.0 $7,994,257  41.8 26 44. $3,916,663  39.4 
MPS 9 5.4 $910,751  4.8 9 15.5 $2,150,751  21.6 
SBE 6 3.6 $261,386  1.4 3 5.2 $570,322  5.7 







0    $0    0    $0  
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the Directorate for Computer & Information Science & Engineering, had the fewest 
projects. In terms of funding, SBE had the least. Of these 3 SBE projects, one came 
under the Division of Behavioral & Cognitive Sciences, and focused on community 
adaptation to changing disasters, and the other two came under the Division of 
Social & Economic Sciences. Of these latter two, one examines the effect of the 
media on public perceptions of an event, and the other focuses on something called 
Ushahidi, which is a method developed for “crowdsourcing” the monitoring of 
disasters. While these projects may address important issues pertinent to the DWH, 
it appears unlikely that any of these address issues specific to economic impacts, 
theory, or methods.  
Turning to other federal agencies, a search of grant opportunities on the 
Grants.gov website, which encompasses most federal sources of publically-
available research funds, the same keyword searches as used above for funding 
opportunities since April 2010 resulted in 13 hits, with total estimated funds of just 
under $23 million (see Table 2). Closer inspection of these opportunities indicated 
that none of these, with the possible exception of the one Economic Development 
Agency opportunity, includes economic analysis of any kind1. 
Table 2. Grant Calls for Proposals Listed on Grants.gov by agency (USD) 
 Agency 
 BSEE EDA EPA FWS NIH NMFS NPS 
# RFPs 1 1 2 1 1 5 2 
 
Est. Funds 5,000,000 ? 300,000 31,700 5,300,000 12,000,000 265,107 
 
Econ. 
Analysis? No Maybe No No No No* No 
*Only one of the 31 individual MARFIN-funded projects explicitly addresses the DWH 
spill, and it does not include economic analysis. 
A search of the funded awards database for the four Gulf of Mexico Sea Grant 
programs (Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi-Alabama, and Texas) resulted in 30 
projects directly related to the DWH oil spill since 2010, with total funding of 
$3,693,718 (including Sea Grant, match, and pass-through funds) (NOAA 2014). 
1 EDA annual reports include a list of projects funded under all supplemental disaster assistance programs. Of 
those listed for the five Gulf states, most appear to be granted to city or county governments for various 
construction projects, and those granted to colleges and universities appear to be directed to various 
entrepreneurial centers, workforce training programs, etc. So it appears that these funds did not go toward 
economic research, per se, but to economic development activities. 
 
                                                 
6
Journal of Ocean and Coastal Economics, Vol. 2014, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 1
https://cbe.miis.edu/joce/vol2014/iss1/1
DOI: 10.15351/2373-8456.1002
Of these 30 projects, only one appears to include any economic analysis, although 
the database shows no actual funding assigned to this project.  
Other potential sources of research and/or funding are the individual Gulf states. 
As mentioned earlier, the de-emphasis on economic valuation of damages at the 
federal level may have the effect of increasing demand for it at the state level. It 
appears that at least one of the Gulf states is involved in additional litigation efforts 
separate from the NRDA process, and has funded some economics work as part of 
that litigation (Larkin, Huffaker and Clouser acknowledge funding from the Office 
of Economic and Demographic Research of the Florida Legislature to estimate 
economic impacts of the DWH spill in their 2013 study). It is likely that other Gulf 
states are doing the same. Based on searches of state websites and publication 
archives, as well as personal communications with individuals in these states, 
however, only one instance of state funds being directed explicitly for the DWH 
spill was found. Neither has the Gulf States Marine Fisheries Commission 
sponsored or conducted any such work. 
The lion’s share of research funding related to the DWH, however, is through 
the Gulf of Mexico Research Initiative (GOMRI, see Table 3), which describes 
itself as “BP’s commitment to provide $500 million in funding over the course of 
10 years for independent scientific research related to the Deepwater Horizon 
incident,” (GOMRI 2014). 
Table 3. GOMRI Grant Funding by Phase 
 All Projects Projects with Economic Analysis  
Funding Phase 
# 
Projects Funding # Projects % of Total Funding 
% of 
Total 
Year 1 Block Grants 158 $45,000,000 1 0.6% $149,999 0.3% 
RFP I 8 $110,000,000 0 0.0% $0 0.0% 
RFP II 19 $18,500,000 0 0.0% $0 0.0% 
RFP III 17 $1,500,000 0 0.0% $0 0.0% 
Total  202 $175,000,000 1 0.5% $149,999 0.1% 
Total Personnel 2,269   2 0.1%     
GOMRI’s first action was to provide $45 million in the form of block grants to 
four Gulf state institutions (Florida Institute of Oceanography, Louisiana State 
University, Marine Environmental Science Consortium, and Northern Gulf 
Institute) and the National Institutes of Health in 2010-2011. Of the 158 individual 
research projects undertaken under the auspices of these five entities, only one 
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focused on some aspect of the economic impacts of the DWH spill, awarded to a 
single researcher in a finance department. No others appear to focus on economic 
research of some kind. GOMRI has since released 4 Requests for Proposals (RFPs), 
and has funded 3 of them (RFPs I, II, and III). RFP IV closed in mid-2014with 
award announcements expected in late 2014. Of the 8 consortia (RFP I) and 36 
projects (RFPs II and III) already funded, none appear to address any economic 
research questions, and this is supported by the fact that, of the 2,269 individuals 
listed on the GOMRI website as personnel involved in one or more GOMRI 
projects, none appear to be housed in an economics, 
applied/environmental/agricultural economics, finance, or business program or 
similar outfit, except for the lone faculty member and master’s student carrying out 
the one project mentioned earlier (based on a keyword search for “economics” of 
all funded project titles and abstracts, as well as one for “economics”, “finance” or 
“business” in the contact information for all GOMRI-funded personnel listed on the 
GOMRI website). Thus, of the $175 million in funds released thus far by GOMRI, 
about one-half of 1% has been directed to economic research of some kind. RFP 
IV does appear to open the door to economics research related to the spill, but does 
so only as a potential sub-focus under the theme of public health. Theme 5 under 
RFP IV addresses the “Impact of oil spills on public health including behavioral, 
socioeconomic, environmental risk assessment, community capacity, and other 
population health considerations and issues.” The “Q & A” section of the GOMRI 
website for RFP IV directs those seeking more information on Theme 5 (the one 
that mentions economics) to a summary of a GOMRI workshop held in July 2013. 
In that summary, it states: 
“At the community level, research topics could focus on community 
resilience, cultural/socioeconomic differences, ecosystem services, 
modeling, translating and processing scientific information, risk 
communication, decision science, community-based participatory research, 
ethnographic methods, economic impacts, and community-wide mental 
health effects. 
 
At the individual level, research topics could focus on psychological and 
physical health, risk management, intervention science, seafood and 
occupational safety, and composite exposures.” (GOMRI 2013) 
Whether any economic research will come out of RFP IV remains to be seen.  
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I turn now to funds directed to the NRDA process itself. A search of the 
USASpending.gov site (Office of Management and Budget 2014), which features 
a ready-made “Gulf Oil Spill” search prominently on the main page (as of July 7, 
2014), it appears that, based simply on project descriptions (e.g., “lost direct and 
passive human use values”) and firm names (e.g., containing the word 
“economics”), that approximately $319 million have been directed to two private 
consulting firms to conduct some kind of economic analysis (the sum of “dollars 
obligated” for Industrial Economics, Inc. and Straus Consulting, Inc., comprising 
54% of overall spending for the Gulf Oil Spill). However, it is likely that the results 
of this research will not become public record, or if it does, it will be quite some 
time until it does. Thus, the economic research funded in this way may or may not 
become part of the literature accessible to the public and other researchers. Then 
again, if Barbier (2011a) is right, then whatever research these funds are supporting 
may turn out to be something altogether different. 
4.  ECONOMICS LITERATURE PERTAINING TO THE DWH: 
HOW MUCH IS OUT THERE? 
Turning to the “output” side, we find mixed evidence for the quantity of research 
publications related to, or resulting from, the DWH spill. A keyword search of 
“Deepwater Horizon” in Google Scholar results in 13,300 hits, excluding citations 
and patents (see Table 4). The same search with the term “economic”, “economics”, 
“economic analysis”, or “economic impact” added to it limits the search to 73%, 
41%, 8%, and 6%, respectively, of the original total. Google Scholar also allows 
for an “In title only” search. Under this more restricted search, the “Deepwater 
Horizon” search yields 788 hits. Adding the various economic terms enumerated 
above yields 1.4%, 0.1%, 0.1%, and 0.3% of the original total, respectively. It is 
worth noting that the analogous keyword searches for “Exxon Valdez” yields 
similar results. So this relative shortage does not appear to be unique to the DWH 
spill. 
Scopus is an academic index that claims to be “the largest abstract and citation 
database of peer-reviewed literature” (Elsevier 2014). A keyword search in Scopus 
for “Deepwater Horizon” results in 1,187 hits. If limited to Scopus’s “Social 
Sciences & Humanities” subject areas, the result is 265 hits. Of these, only 16 are 
in the subcategory “Economics, Econometrics, and Finance”. To give some 
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perspective, a keyword search of the term “Exxon Valdez” yields 878 hits. Only 
110 of these are in “Social Sciences & Humanities” subject areas, and of these, 24 
qualify as articles in the subcategory “Economics, Econometrics, and Finance”.  
Table 4. Results of Google Scholar Search 
 Exxon Valdez Deepwater Horizon 
Search Terms Hits 
% of 
Total Hits % of Total 
General Search 








0 73% 7,320 55% 
"+ economics" 
10,30
0 41% 3,860 29% 
"+ economic analysis" 2,120 8% 604 5% 
"+ economic impact" 1,610 6% 808 6% 
 
In Title only 
"Exxon Valdez" / "Deepwater 
Horizon" 827  788  
"+ economic" 7 0.8% 11 1.4% 
"+ economics" 1 0.1% 1 0.1% 
"+ economic analysis" 2 0.2% 1 0.1% 
"+ economic impact" 1 0.1% 2 0.3% 
 
Similarly, a keyword search for “Deepwater Horizon” in the American 
Economic Association’s electronic bibliography database EconLit (AEA 2014), 
which indexes over 120 years of economics literature from around the world, results 
in 23 hits since 2010, 13 of which are journal articles (see Table 5). If the search is 
expanded to include the terms “oil spill” or “Gulf of Mexico oil” as well, then there 
are 75 hits, 49 of which are journal articles. However, not all of these address the 
DWH spill directly, and some are not actually related at all. By comparison, the 
keyword search “Exxon Valdez” yields 32 hits since 1989, 24 of which are 
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Table 5. Keyword Search Results for EconLit and IDEAS/RePEc since 2010 (1989 for 
Valdez) 
 EconLit IDEAS / RePEc 






"Deepwater Horizon" 23 13 37 19 
"Deepwater Horizon", "oil 
spill", or "Gulf of Mexico 
oil" 
75 49 393 55 
"Exxon Valdez" 32 24 40 31 
A keyword search for “Deepwater Horizon” in the IDEAS database of RePEc 
(Research Papers in Economics 2014) yields somewhat more hits, in this case 37 
since 2010, 19 of which are academic journal articles (see Table 5). Expanding the 
search to include the terms “oil spill” or “Gulf of Mexico oil” as well increases the 
hits to 393, 55 of which are journal articles. By comparison, “Exxon Valdez” yields 
40 hits since 1989, 31 of which are academic journal articles. So, there appears to 
be mixed evidence as to the quantity of economics-related output. Relative to other 
disciplines, the amount appears very small. However, limiting the search to 
economics-focused databases, the quantity of output ranges from a low of 23 
publications to a high of 3932. Furthermore, we should point out that many of the 
economic hits cited here are papers that report potential economic impacts or 
preliminary assessments of the DWH. We now turn to a summary of the research 
issues emerging and contributions already made by the literature found in the 
aforementioned searches.  
4.1  Economics Literature pertaining to the DWH: Specific Contributions 
The bulk of extant literature related to the DWH incident focuses on the incentives 
and policies in place to promote a culture of safety in the offshore oil industry, 
especially for deepwater drilling. Other areas addressed include impacts on wetland 
2These would include papers such as Aldy (2011); Hanson and Baker (2011); IEM (2010); 
Mendelssohn et al. (2012); Oxford Economics (2010); Posadas and Posadas (2013); Sumaila et al. 
(2012); and Upton (2011). 
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restoration efforts, fisheries, real estate, consumer choice and perceptions of 
seafood, and public attitudes on oil production and spills. 
4.1.1  Safety in the Offshore Oil Industry 
Anderson et al. (2011) address industry safety with particular focus on the Marine 
Well Containment Company (MWCC), a consortium aimed at designing and 
building a system capable of containing future deepwater spills in the Gulf. They 
focus on the roles of liability and regulation as determinants of readiness and the 
adequacy of incentives for technological innovation in oil spill containment 
technology to keep pace with advances in deepwater drilling capability.  
Cohen et al. (2011) discuss the economic and policy forces that affect oil 
drilling safety and identify reasons why those forces may or may not be effective. 
Concerned that raising liability caps without mandating insurance or increasing 
financial responsibility requirements could have little effect on small firms that 
would sooner declare bankruptcy, they recommend a liability cap for each well 
equal to the worst-case social costs of a spill and require insurance up to the cap.  
Cooke, Ross, and Stern (2011) apply the Accident Sequence Precursor (ASP) 
program, originally developed in response to the Three Mile Island nuclear 
meltdown, to the challenges of low-frequency high-consequence events such as the 
DWH spill. The ASP approach foregoes in-depth modeling at individual facilities 
and uses instead generic event trees to reflect macroscopic design of safety systems. 
The approach lacks detail but captures system dependencies missing in 
Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA). They recommend this approach a promising 
means of promoting cost-effective, risk-informed oversight on the industry. 
Viscusi and Zeckhauser (2011) propose a regulatory and liability framework to 
encourage parties involved in offshore drilling to take appropriate actions. This 
proposal replaces the current structure of a low damages cap coupled with 
ineffective regulation with a system that greatly expands the level of liability, 
coupled with a tax, to provide incentives for risks beyond the liability limit. They 
argue that this system creates strong financial incentives for safety.  
Muehlenbachs, Staubli, and Cohen (2013) analyze the effect of the number of 
inspectors as well as the effect of familiarity between inspector and inspected party 
on the severity of sanctions issued. From these results, they estimate the 
effectiveness of increasing enforcement on the deterrence of incidents, but find only 
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weak evidence that increasing sanction severity increases deterrence. 
Muehlenbachs, Cohen, and Gerarden (2014) analyze company-reported incidents 
on offshore oil platforms between 1996 and 2010 and find that, controlling for other 
factors, each 100 feet of added depth increases the probability of an incident by 
8.5%, suggesting the need for increased monitoring of deeper-water platforms.  
4.1.2 Wetland Restoration 
Barbier (2011a) summarizes the current status of wetland restoration efforts in the 
Gulf Coast, particularly in Louisiana, as well as the ecological and economic 
challenges to restoration. He highlights the renewed interest in wetland restoration 
following both the 2005 hurricanes and the DWH oil spill. He summarizes the 
current practice of habitat equivalency analysis (HEA) to carry out compensatory 
restoration, and its shortcomings, including the likely main criticism of an HEA: 
that it may not provide an accurate reflection of the actual costs and benefits of 
compensatory restoration, because it is based on a replacement cost approach to 
valuation. The points raised by Barbier are particularly important because they 
highlight the potential flaws in an HEA approach, which currently dominates the 
NRDA process, and has recently displaced economic valuation as the major 
approach for damage assessment. He also addresses the key ecological and 
economic issues that must be addressed for wetland restoration to be successful. 
With respect to the former, he points out that compensatory damage mitigation, 
such as wetland banking and compensatory restoration, depends on the principle of 
ecological equivalence, which may not be achieved in practice. With respect to 
economics, he points out that the economic literature is severely lacking in terms 
of quantifying and assessing the economic benefits of ecosystem restoration, 
especially for aquatic ecosystems.  
4.1.3 Fisheries 
Alvarez et al. (2014) apply a coarser definition of geographical zones to recreational 
fishing. This alternative definition still permits substitution between areas 
potentially affected by an oil spill that is better suited for spills with a large spatial 
extent. They also develop a quasi-real-time measure of impacts using fishery 
closure maps that more accurately captures behavioral changes. Asche et al. (2012) 
extend the use of time series analysis of market integration to the world market for 
shrimp. One of the key findings relevant to the DWH is that they find significant 
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evidence of integration in the U.S. shrimp market, suggesting that the economic 
losses in 2010 domestic shrimp production – if in fact caused by the DWH spill – 
was not likely offset by higher prices; rather imports of farmed shrimp increased to 
satisfy demand. 
4.1.4  Real Estate 
Winkler and Gordon (2013) introduce the use of monthly event dichotomous 
variables to measure abnormal property sales volume and prices in a hedonic 
pricing model. Epley (2012) applies the “before-and-after” procedure to coastal 
Alabama property, relying on market trends shown in the total population of deed 
recordings, which allows for the impact of a potential stigma (i.e., an adverse effect 
on property value produced by the market’s perception of increased environmental 
risk due to contamination) to be estimated. 
4.1.5  Household Choice and Perceptions 
Several other papers contribute to our understanding of the DWH accident on 
household choices and perceptions. Morgan et al. (2013) take advantage of the 
natural experiment setting offered by the DWH to extend joint revealed-preference 
/ stated-preference models for estimation of both short-term and long-term effects 
of the spill on consumer demand for oysters. Hamilton, Safford, and Ulrich (2012) 
conducted a survey of Florida and Louisiana households about changes in their 
environmental preferences and perceptions as a result of the DWH spill. They found 
that one-fourth of respondents said that their environmental views had changed as 
a result of the spill.  However, the patterns observed tend to reflect differences in 
the coastlines that shaped their socioeconomic development, with Louisiana 
respondents less likely to support a deepwater moratorium, alternative energy, or 
resource conservation.  
Farrow and Larson (2012) identify an incremental willingness to pay for news 
about the Exxon Valdez spill and argue how this private value associated with 
media consumption can be interpreted as a partial measure of social costs for 
passive viewers who take no further action beyond news viewing and likely 
represent the majority of affected citizens.  Lilley and Firestone (2013) conducted 
nation-wide household surveys before and after the DWH to compare public 
attitudes regarding offshore oil drilling and offshore wind development. They find 
that there was a significant drop in support for expanded drilling among coastal 
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residents but not others. Other papers published since the DWH spill that address 
aspects of the economics of oil spills appear to be motivated not by the DWH 
accident, but rather by the 2002 Prestige oil spill in Spain (Alló and Loureiro 2013; 
León, Arańa, Hanemann, and Riera 2014; Loureiro and Loomis 2013). 
5. EMERGING RESEARCH DIRECTION: ECOSYSTEM 
SERVICES VALUATION 
We now turn to a discussion of research topics on the frontier that have gained in 
prominence as a consequence of the DWH accident. The one that appears to have 
gained the most traction is the integration of ecosystem services valuation into the 
Natural Resource Damage Assessment (NRDA) process. Boyd (2010) issued a call 
for this immediately after the DWH spill occurred, and this theme was expanded 
upon greatly in the 2013 report issued by the National Academies (Committee on 
the Effects of the Deepwater Horizon Mississippi Canyon-252 Oil Spill on 
Ecosystem Services in the Gulf of Mexico), which was influenced heavily by 
Barbier (2011a). Scarlett and Boyd (2011) expanded the call for ecosystem services 
valuation to existing federal regulations and programs and Barbier (2013) targeted 
the call to wetland protection and restoration. These follow on the heels of a 
growing number of calls for increased use of an ecosystems-based approach to 
resource management (Bagstad et al. 2012; Committee on Assessing and Valuing 
the Services of Aquatic and Related Terrestrial Ecosystems 2005; Daily et al. 
2009).  
The ecosystem services approach differs from traditional valuation approaches 
in that it focuses not on the value of the resource itself, but on the value of the 
benefits -- the goods and services -- it provides. The 2004 National Academies 
report argues that this approach has the potential to change the public’s perceptions 
of natural resources and the way agencies manage them, because it “highlights the 
ways in which healthy ecosystems support healthy economies.” (p. 1) Barbier 
(2011b) argues that it facilitates a focus on competing uses, such as conservation 
versus development, and the need to account for the value of ecosystem services to 
make efficient choices. Specific to damage assessment, Boyd (2010) argues that 
“lost ecosystem goods and services are the right metric to internalize social costs 
and make the public whole following a marine pollution or damage incident.” (p. 
2).  
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Because with an ecosystems services approach the focus is shifted from the 
resources themselves to the services provided, it will necessarily change the types 
of data collected and the means used to collect them. Barbier (2011b) argues that 
an advantage of viewing coastal/marine ecosystems as capital assets capable of 
producing goods and services is that it allows application of the standard tools and 
analysis developed by natural resource economists for modeling these complex 
systems. 
Both Boyd (2010) and Barbier (2011a) point out that with most NRDAs, 
government trustees have relied on more practical alternatives to the calculation of 
actual social costs of pollution such as restoration costs, i.e., the expenditures 
necessary to return a damaged resource to its pre-incident status. (The Exxon 
Valdez case was a prominent exception, where an extensive contingent-valuation 
survey was used to estimate lost passive-use values.)  
The key to successful implementation of an ecosystem services approach to 
valuation and damage assessment lies in the ability to develop tools capable of 
demonstrating and measuring causal links between an event such as an oil spill, an 
injury to the ecosystem, the decrease in services provided by the system, and the 
value of that decrease. The 2004 National Academies report identifies three major 
obstacles to successful implementation of an ecosystem services approach. The first 
is the difficulty in establishing a baseline measurement of goods and services 
produced by the system just prior to the event. As Boyd (2010) points out in 
particular for open-sea oil spills such as the DWH and the Exxon Valdez, the 
demonstration of causality between a marine accident and economically-
meaningful service changes may need to be made over large geographic areas and 
long time periods. Such relationships are likely to require expensive and data-
intensive methods and not likely to be uniform from one location to another.  
The second is the difficulty in developing a model that can predict the event’s 
impact on the ecosystem and provide defensible estimates of the magnitude of 
reduced services. As Barbier (2013) points out, “we often do not know how 
variation in ecosystem structure, functions, and processes give rise to the change in 
an ecosystem good or service,” (p. 215). Progress is being been made in this regard, 
however, including the work of Link, Fulton, and Gamble (2010); Pelletier et al. 
(2009); and Rodwell et al. (2002).  
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The third is the challenge of establishing capabilities to place economic values 
on lost services. As both Barbier (2013) and Börger et al. (2014) point out, revealed 
preference methods such as hedonic and travel cost models are not applicable to 
many marine ecosystem services, such as those provided by the deep sea, due to a 
lack of any direct effect on market behavior from which to infer values. Thus, there 
may be a need for greater reliance on valuation estimates from bio-economic 
models (e.g., Barbier 2012; Barbier and Lee 2013; Fenichel and Abbott 2014; 
Finnoff and Tschirhart 2003a, 2003b; Sanchirico and Mumby 2009), or with the 
use of stated-preference methods, such as contingent valuation and choice 
experiments (e.g., Bagstad et al. 2012; Bauer, Cyr, and Swallow 2004; Carlsson, 
Frykblom, and Liljenstolpe 2003; Holmes et al. 2004; Moore, Holmes, and Bell 
2011; Loomis et al. 2000; Petrolia, Interis, and Hwang 2014), or contingent 
behavior, although the latter is geared less to valuation. As Börger et al. (2014) 
point out, stated-preference methods require careful attention to survey designs to 
convey meaningful and understandable descriptions of ecosystem services to the 
general public. It also requires that these descriptions be based on meaningful 
ecological indicators (Johnston et al. 2012 and Zhao, Johnston, and Schultz 2013). 
Barbier (2007) compares the production-function and the expected-damage 
approaches and shows that they yield very different valuations of ecosystems than 
would be obtained by more typical methods used. He argues that these represent a 
significant improvement over current practice. 
Barbier (2012) and Barbier and Lee (2013) point to another important 
challenge, which is the ability to capture the spatial variability of ecological 
production of ecosystem services across specific coastal habitats (such as marsh 
and mangroves), as well as the “connectivity” of marine habitats (such as 
mangrove-sea grass-coral reefs) in producing ecosystem services. Barbier (2011b) 
points out a further challenge: uncertainty about the future values of the services 
provided. Values may change over time because preferences may change over time 
or because, as our understanding increases about how these complex ecosystems 
work, we may come to better appreciate the services provided. Also, continued 
growth in coastal populations may lead to irreversible increases in resource 
scarcity, leading to higher values. 
Other papers point to additional shortcomings in the literature regarding 
ecosystem services valuation (Ruckelshaus et al. 2013; Laurans et al. 2013; 
Pendleton, Atiyah, and Moorthy 2007), and Börger et al. (2014) and Barbier 
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(2011a) point out a shortcoming specific to wetland and marine habitat valuation: 
the extremely uneven distribution across habitat types, services, and locations, with 
most work being done on near-coast provisioning, regulating, and cultural 
(specifically, recreational) services, such as beaches, fisheries, and coastal 
properties, and only minimal work on the open ocean and deep sea (e.g., Jobstvogt 
et al. 2014; Ressurreicão et al. 2011; Wattage et al. 2011). This lack of 
understanding of the deep sea is echoed by the 2013 National Academies report, 
particularly because of the recent growth of deepwater oil and gas exploration and 
production, and of course, the DWH disaster.  
6.    ANOTHER RESEARCH DIRECTION: INJURY TO 
REPUTATION AS COMPENSABLE DAMAGE 
Another direction of research as a consequence of the DWH spill is one offered by 
Larkin, Huffaker, and Clouser (2013), which proposes reduced “place-brand” value 
of a state, i.e., injury to its reputation, as a recoverable loss under the OPA damages 
category specifying the “loss of profits or impairments of earning capacity due to 
the injury, destruction, or loss of real property, personal property, or natural 
resources, which shall be recoverable by any claimant.” They propose a model that 
interprets a place-brand as a capital asset that generates an income stream by 
stimulating demand for regional services, such as Florida’s reputation for high-
quality natural marine-based resources. Assuming an oil spill impairs the value of 
this place-brand, the difference between user and non-user willingness to pay 
represents the lost place-brand value during the period of recovery (Larkin, 
Huffaker, and Clouser 2013). At the household level, something of this effect is 
captured in the work of Winkler and Gordon (2013), who find that oceanfront 
condominium prices in Alabama declined not only during the time that health 
advisories were in effect, but also after they were lifted, suggesting that there still 
existed a high level of uncertainty regarding the future effects of the spill. Very 
closely related to this is the issue of liability arising from the deepwater drilling 
moratorium. Shavell (2011) raises the very important question of whether BP 
should be liable for economic damages to other firms that were unable to operate 
due to the moratorium as a consequence of the DWH spill. In this context, it is also 
worth noting the irony of a working paper by Barrage, Chyn, and Hastings (2014) 
that analyzes how BP’s own efforts prior to the DWH accident to establish and 
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maintain a “green” reputation may have softened the blow of “consumer 
punishment” of BP afterward. 
7. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has summarized the sources and levels of funding for economics 
research stemming from the DWH oil spill, the research that has been produced, 
and an overview of prominent research topics and directions. Based on these 
findings, it appears that relatively little economic research has been funded by the 
major sources doling out research funds for the DWH. An immediate question is 
why has economics research apparently been under-funded? A reasonable 
explanation for why GOMRI has funded very little economics research is that BP 
probably does not want to fund research that could be used against it in court. One 
could hardly blame them. To fund research as to the biophysical damages is one 
thing, but to fund research that has the potential to directly calculate dollar estimates 
of damages is another. It seems, though, that some reasonable stipulations could 
have been put in place to restrict any economics research to be “forward looking”, 
i.e., to be geared toward preventing and preparing for the next oil spill rather than 
estimating damages of the current one. Then again, it is possible that even that kind 
of research could become a weapon in the hands of the plaintiffs.  
A similar rationale may explain why the various state and federal agencies have 
not produced much or any economics-related impact reports on the DWH as they 
did, for example, after both Hurricanes Katrina/Rita and Sandy. For example, 
Louisiana Sea Grant provides links to two economic impact assessments for 
Hurricane Katrina (fisheries losses and resource damages) on their website, but 
nothing similar for the DWH. Instead, only general descriptions of the NRDA 
process are provided. Also, the U.S. Economics and Statistics Administration, a 
division of the Department of Commerce, published an impact assessment of 
Katrina in 2008 (actually 6 versions of it) (USESA 2008) as well as an economic 
impact study a year after Hurricane Sandy (USESA 2013). For the DWH, however, 
they issued a report on the impacts of the moratorium, but not on the spill itself. 
NOAA-NMFS published reports on fisheries impacts due to Hurricane Katrina 
(before DWH) and Hurricane Sandy (after DWH), but the NMFS oil spill site (and 
other web searches) brings up no such report for the DWH. Here, too, a reasonable 
explanation comes to mind: if mistakes are made on estimating damages after a 
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hurricane, there are no real consequences (other than embarrassment for the agency 
and researcher), but with an oil spill, getting the numbers right is critical to the 
outcome of the NRDA and litigation processes. So state and federal agencies may 
not want to stick their neck out at the risk of making a mistake, and instead leave 
such work to the “experts” involved in the NRDA process. The problem with this 
approach is that it appears that the NRDA process may have moved away from 
economic valuation of damages altogether (Barbier 2011a). Only time will tell if 
the states have “filled the valuation void” left by the changes in the NRDA process, 
or if we will end up with very little economic assessment of the damages due to the 
DWH being done at all. 
These apparent shortcomings make it all the more troubling that NSF and other 
major sources of public research dollars did not fund more work for economics on 
the DWH than what it appears to have done up to this point. One would expect NSF 
to be relatively independent of the politics of the process, and if an event of 
significance merited economic research then they would fund it, regardless of 
whether – on the one extreme -- a large amount of funds were already being directed 
to the NRDA process for valuation – or on the other extreme – that the NRDA 
process had moved away from economic valuation of damages so that little to no 
valuation work was being done. Comparing to other significant environmental 
events in the recent past, NSF issued quite a bit of research funds for economics-
related research in response to Hurricane Katrina (38 projects listed under the BCS-
SBE division out of 302 total projects funded) although for Super-storm Sandy, 
NSF appears to have funded only four BCS-SBE projects out of 593.  
It could be simply that economics research is not viewed as critical relative to 
many of the other fields that did receive funding after the DWH. It is true that 
economists generally require lower funding levels relative to many of the sciences 
that require expensive equipment, ship time, and other costly things. But the 
findings reported here indicate differences well beyond accounting for differences 
in funding scale. If it is because economics just simply is not perceived as a critical 
area of research following such events – or as the shift in the NRDA process 
implies, is perceived as something to be avoided altogether -- then the economics 
field has its work cut out for it in demonstrating both its importance and its 
reliability, not only of estimating the value of damages, but also in making 
3Based on a keyword search for “Katrina” (“Sandy”) since 2005 (2012), and deleting projects for 
which project personnel names included Katrina (Sandy). 
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investments to push economic theory and methods further so that we are better 
prepared to make good policy decisions in the future. It may have been useful had 
the economics discipline engaged its leading experts in “setting the stage” for what 
is known, what is needed, laying out the key issues, etc., including where theoretical 
and methodological advances are needed to better deal with major events like the 
DWH. With the exception of the 2012 AEA symposium updating the contingent-
valuation debate, however, it appears that none of the major economics or 
environmental/natural-resource economics associations or journals organized any 
symposia or special issues dedicated to the largest accidental marine oil spill in 
history4. This could be because those individuals most likely to make contributions 
were already engaged in the NRDA and other state litigation processes, and thus 
unable to contribute. Nevertheless, it seems like an opportunity for the economics 
discipline to contribute to the discussion was missed.  
Perhaps the best days are ahead. Perhaps some of the remaining $325 million 
of GOMRI funds will end up going toward economics research. It is also hoped 
that some funding will go toward economics research via the individual state 
research centers of excellence mandated to be established using a portion of 
RESTORE Act funds. In terms of research outputs, it is hoped that more economic 
research has been stimulated by the DWH than what the findings here indicate and 
that this research will start to show up in the literature in the coming years. It is 
worth noting that it took over ten years for the results of the Carson et al. (2003) 
Exxon Valdez contingent valuation study to appear in the refereed journal literature. 
Only time will tell the full story of what the field of economics had to say about the 
DWH spill and what impact the DWH had on economics.  
In the meantime, it appears that there are three priority areas regarding the 
economics of large marine oil spills. First, the push to better understand and correct 
the incentives faced by the oil and gas sector that affect safety, prevention, and 
clean-up in deepwater needs to continue. Second, if it is true that the NRDA process 
has moved away from valuation as a means of assessing damages, then the 
economics discipline needs to make a convincing argument why that was a bad 
idea, and needs to demonstrate why economic valuation techniques need to be 
retained as a major part of the process. It appears that the most promising means of 
4The Vanderbilt Law School did sponsor a conference entitled “Rigs, Risks, and Responsibility”, 
which featured some very prominent economists, and the contents of which were later published 
as a special issue in the Vanderbilt Law Review.  
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making this case is by demonstrating the advantages of taking an ecosystem service 
valuation approach to natural-resource damage assessment. Third, given that much 
of the oil and gas exploration and production activities in the near future will take 
place in deepwater, the current shortage of research specific to deepwater marine 
resources needs to be addressed. If additional resources in the economics discipline 
can be dedicated to addresses these three areas, then we should be in a better 
position to both reduce the likelihood of such disasters occurring in the future, and, 
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